Introduction
Since the first Open Skies agreement was signed between the United States (US) and the Netherlands in 1978, the US has been making every possible effort to expand its Open Skies partners around the world. China, as one of the fastest growing aviation markets and economies, as well as US's key trading partner, is among its top priorities And finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
China's Policy and Experience of Domestic Deregulation and International

Liberalization
Founded in early 1950s, China's airline industry was controlled by the military through the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC), a division of the Air Force. This organization was then separated from the military and became a civilian authority directly under the State Council of China in 1980, with six regional administrative bureaus created at the same time.
Between 1980 and 1986, CAAC acted not only as an industry regulator, but also as the owner of the country's sole airline (CAAC) engaged in its day-to-day operations. All aspects of the industry, such as market entry, route authority, frequencies, fare, aircraft purchasing, funding and even passenger eligibility for taking flights, heavily controlled by this government agency (Zhang and Chen, 2003) . Such a centralized system was challenged by the rapid air traffic growth starting from the mid-1980s, and the industry was decentralized with a number of new airlines established and various reforms taking place after 1986. A particular noteworthy reform was airline consolidation in 2002 where nine CAAC-controlled airlines were consolidated into three airline groups, namely, Air China, China Eastern and China Southern airlines. After the 2002 airline consolidation, the Chinese government gradually deregulated the domestic market; carriers were given greater freedom on route entry and more power to determine their own airfares (Lei and O'Connell, 2011) . During this process, CAAC completed its own transformation from both a regulator and an operator to a pure industry watchdog.
As airline consolidation was completed in 2005, CAAC also removed its restrictions on private investment for domestic airlines. By the end of 2008, CAAC approved 14 new scheduled passenger airlines, with the majority of them being controlled by domestic private investors (Lei and O'Connell, 2011) . The entry of the new carriers has intensified competition in the domestic market. By the end of 2014, airlines in the domestic market in China have enjoyed a high degree of freedom in route entry, subject to slot availability, and are able to set prices at market determined levels. Premium fares in China were completely deregulated in 2012, although a cap on economy class fares in the domestic market, designed to protect consumers, was still in place in 2015.
In the international market, China was guided by a conservative policy until the late 1990s. Its policy aim was to protect the interests of its own carriers. This was partly because air transport was considered as a political instrument to serve China's diplomatic needs, instead of a strategic sector in support of the country's economic development. Such mindset was gradually changed as the Chinese economy became increasingly integrated into the world economy and the country was more exposed to the outside world. In 2003, CAAC declared China's objective to liberalize its air transport market in a "proactive, progressive, orderly and safeguarded" manner, and to take a proactive attitude in embracing the trend of international liberalization.
Since then, the industry regulator started to re-adjust its international policy in support of liberalization and international cooperation, and in the first several years took very radical steps forward. A fundamental change was that the interests of its own carriers would no longer be the sole and exclusive criteria for the government when negotiating traffic rights with foreign countries. At this time the key principles of CAAC's international air transport policy were as follows:
 To proactively embrace the trend of liberalization  To support China's overall diplomatic policies  To support the national Opening-up Strategy and the objectives of social and economic development  To give special regard to meet the demand for international air transport required by the country's foreign trade and tourism  To give special support to the western, northeast and central regions to establish and improve their international air links  To strike a balance among national interests, public interests and industry interests  To promote airport hub development in China  To enhance overall competitiveness of the whole industry. (Han, 2014) As a result of the application of these new perspectives by 2014, China's international aviation policy had the following characteristics: (1) multiple designation was allowed with 86 countries among the 115 Air Service Agreements (ASAs); (2) 27 ASAs had open route schedules; (3) 21
ASAs have introduced unlimited capacity entitlements for 3rd and 4th freedom traffic rights for air cargo services; (4) cargo 5th traffic rights was agreed with eight countries (Han, 2014) .
China also agreed to relax pricing by adopting the "country of origin principle" or the "doubledisapproval principle" (Han, 2014) . Within these policy achievements, the 2004 Protocol with the US, and the subsequent 2007 Protocol, were the most remarkable and were regarded as milestones in the liberalization of China's aviation policy. After ten years of liberalization policy negotiations, the most liberal and flexible bilateral traffic rights regime was still the one with the US.
Evolution of the China-US Air Services Agreement
China and the US established diplomatic relations on 1 January, 1979. China-US aviation links were formally established a year later by the signing of the bilateral Air Services Agreement.
Two carriers from each side were allowed to operate on specific routes (Route A and Route B 1 ) as shown in Table 1 . Based on that simple start six amendments were made in 1982, 1992, 1995, 1999, 2004 and 2007 . Among these changes the 2004 and the 2007 Protocols were regarded as China's most ambitious attempts in its international liberalization efforts and form the basis of the research outlined here. Organization (WTO). There was an average 10% annual passenger growth rate, and 28% for air cargo (DOT, 1999 (DOT, -2003 . Driven by this booming market, US carriers were keen to further expand their operations, but found themselves constrained by the capacity entitlements in the existing ASA and they collectively used up all the 54 weekly frequencies by 2001, only two years after the 1999 Protocol was signed. Faced with growing demand but constrained by regulatory restrictions, the only solution for US carriers was to apply for additional flights.
By contrast, Chinese carriers were less enthusiastic in providing further capacity on the routes. -
It is noteworthy that Chinese aviation market was divided into three zones when details of frequencies were specified, as can be seen in There are several other important aspects of the 2004 Protocol. It was the first time that foreign carriers were allowed to set up cargo hubs in China with full traffic rights. The relaxation on pricing control from double-approval to double-disapproval was unusual for China, given the Chinese legacy of market regulation and the weak financial performance of its major airlines.
Furthermore, domestic, bilateral and third-country code-sharing were allowed though third country code-sharing of either Party needs to be agreed by airlines of the other Party, and is still subject to government approval on a case-by-case basis. Another important development not visible in Table   2 is that restrictions on commercial activities, including change of gauge and self-handling were relaxed in phased-in manner (US Department of State, 2004) . Although the 2004 Protocol was not a full "Open Skies" that the US had aimed at, it was the most liberal agreement China had ever signed with a major trading partner and was described as a "Free Skies" deal by the US (Field, 2004) since it effectively created a regional "Open Skies" with China (Beane, 2007) . 
China's Considerations in Reaching the 2004 and 2007 Protocols
Acknowledging the very substantial differences in the scale of the airlines as well as in the economic and policy systems of the two nations involved, it is perhaps surprising that the China's position at that time as it sought WTO membership; it may have believed that the US's support would be of paramount importance to achieve such a target (Prime, 2002) . a platform for senior officials to meet regularly for discussions of issues of strategic importance to both countries. By including traffic rights into SED negotiations the US was trying to overcome difficulties it believed it faced at the industry level (Williams, 2009 ). This was an influence upon the 2007 Protocol, as the aviation negotiations were under a sort of obligation to deliver some meaningful achievements in this broad strategic context (Russell, 2007) . At the time bilateral air talks were specially timed by both sides with the aim of fitting any possible conclusions of agreements into the SED programme (Russell, 2007) . Schofield (2007) argued that rights in aviation might even have been intentionally sacrificed to ensure US concessions in other areas, because when looked at in isolation, the Chinese were not well placed to achieve many positive gains from opening up their market further to US airlines. 
The Impacts of the 2004 and 2007 Protocols
Most studies find that liberalisation of bilaterals triggered substantial traffic growth (GomezIbanez and Morgan, 1984; Dresner and Windle, 1995; Marlin, 1995; Maillebiau and Hansen, 1995; Piermartini and Rousova, 2008; Warnock-Smith and Morrell, 2008) . Table 3 
--------------------------------INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE-------------------------------------
Given access to more recent data it is now possible to explore the effect of this two stage liberalization on the market as it was operating in 2014. The impact of liberalization can be charted via the change in the number of airlines, and the city pairs flown. Table 3 Table 3 clearly shows that China follows "one route, one airline" policy, so that only one airline from China is allowed to serve a route in the China-US market. The arrangement seems to protect Chinese airlines from internal competition, while boosting the potential of each US city market for the designated carrier.
Over half of the airport-pair markets were served by one airline only, which might suggest a lack of local competition as a result of the national liberalization. However, given the complexity of the domestic networks in both China and the US, connecting passengers account for a big share of the total traffic on each city pair. So in essence the routes themselves are in Beijing and Shanghai are heavily congested and it is difficult to obtain additional slots, hence limiting US carriers' ability to expand capacity in the Chinese market.
------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE--------------------------------------------------------------------INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE--------------------------------------
Though US carriers were given unrestricted traffic rights to serve airports in China's more remote Zone 3 in 2007, US carriers appear to be unenthusiastic about serving airports outside of Beijing and Shanghai. This is understandable as most of the outbound traffic to the US is concentrated in Beijing and Shanghai which makes direct flights from other cities to the US not economically viable. As will be discussed below, these markets can also be served via code-share flights through Tokyo, Seoul and Hong Kong. Consequently, in recent years US carriers only managed to increase their weekly frequencies to China from 109 in 2011 to 129 in 2014 (see Table 4 Protocols, especially as the initial impacts were firmly biased toward the US.
The cost of airfares is of course a major consideration in liberalization policies. -
As previously discussed, an important consideration of China to liberalize its air transport market was to prevent third-country traffic diversion. However, Figure 4 reveals that passenger leakage to other hubs has worsened in the past few years. Passengers travelling in the China-US market more than doubled from 1.3 million in 2008 to 2.7 million in 2013 according to PaxIS database. In 2008, 14% of passengers travelling between China and the US were "lost" to other countries, of which over 97% connected at Tokyo, Seoul and Hong Kong. By 2013 the ratio of passenger leakage to a third country increased to 20%, of which 86% passengers were diverted through Seoul, Hong Kong and Tokyo. While Hong Kong is a Special Administrative
Region of China, the loss of traffic to Seoul and Tokyo is an alarming finding for Chinese airports, whose hub building strategy has been seriously challenged. Such a high ratio of traffic leakage may be due to the following reasons. One is that US airlines traditionally use Tokyo as a hub for Asia Pacific traffic. Another reason is that airlines in Japan and Korea provide higher frequencies to more non-stop destinations in the US at lower prices than their Chinese counterparts (Fu et al, 2015) , hence attracting substantial Chinese passengers transferring at Incheon and Narita.
-
The increasing traffic diversion through Japan and Korea makes US's demand for more liberal arrangements on third-country code-sharing unacceptable to China (Fu et al, 2015) . Both Japan , 1999, 2004, 2007) Note: the data are based on the first week of July in each year for direct passenger flights in the China-US market. Source: Compiled by the authors from OAG database. 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000
